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During the turn of the century, Chinese government has successively completed 
the reform of the joint-stock of four state-owned commercial banks, The systemic risk 
of the financial has deeply decreased and the state-owned banking industry has got 
rapid development. China's state-owned commercial banks accounted for half in total 
banking assets. The stated owned banks absolutely dominate the China's banking 
industry. Despite the shareholding system reform has been completed and made a 
number of achievements, China's state-owned commercial banks, there are still a 
number of corporate governance issues, and this is what this article is going to 
investigated. 
This article discusses from a general analysis of corporate governance, and then 
discusses peculiarities of the commercial banks and state-owned commercial banks. 
Then this paper reviews the changes of corporate governance of state-owned 
Commercial Bank of China and points the two characteristics of corporate governance 
of state-owned commercial bank after the corporate governance reform. That is the 
incentive system under party in charge of finance and the strategic investors are 
joining governance as well as the shareholder of the china China's state-owned 
commercial banks.The essence of the party in charge of finance of state-owned 
commercial banks managers entrusted with the economic and administrative of dual 
tasks. Chapter 3 discuss the incentive issues of state-owned commercial banks 
managers through a multitask principal-agent model and draw the conclusions the 
managers are tends to focus on the political target .Because of this, The government 
hopes that the behavior of managers can be corrected by the entering of  strategic 
investors. Chapter 4 discusses the corporate governance which is participated by 
strategic investors and argues that the majority shareholder of state-owned 













by inviting the foreign strategic investors to some extent .and distinguish the two 
different foreign strategic investors. Chapter 5 focuses on econometric test and lists a 
successful example by China's state-owned commercial banks with the foreign 
strategic investors in governance and proves the above conclusion and made the 
appropriate repair. The foreign strategic investor does improve the achievement of 
China's state-owned commercial banks. But we have to rethink the other impacts. 
Chapter 6 lists some foreign practices by foreign strategic investors into native 
nation-owned commercial banks to illustrate the practice of foreign capital into its 
banking sector to the attention when the matter is that to attract investment and to 
provide experience and lessons that should be learned in China. Chapter 7 draws the 
conclusions and points out some policy recommendations of this article according 
above analysis. 
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性改革阶段。1998 年 8 月，中央政府发行 2700 亿特别国债来补充四大国有商业
银行资本金；1999 年，国务院相继成立信达、东方、长城、华融四家金融资产
管理公司，实施“债转股”，对四大国有商业银行进行不良贷款剥离，以改善其







































1.2)。截止 2008 年末，国有商业银行资产总规模达到 31.84 万亿元，占据银行
业总资产的“半壁江山”，中国工商银行、中国银行、中国建设银行和交通银行
的资本充足率分别达到 13.06%、13.43%、12.16%、13.47%；不良贷款率分别为







表 1.1 主要商业银行不良贷款率表(2003—2008) 
不良贷款率/年份 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
不良贷款率(%) 17.9 13.2 8.9 7.5 6.7 2.4 
次级(%) 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.5 1.0 1.1 
可疑(%) 9.4 6.8 3.4 3.1 2.4 1.1 
损失(%) 5.7 4.0 3.4 2.9 3.3 0.2 
数据来源：中国银行业监管管理委员会年报(2008) 
 
表 1.2 商业银行资本充足率达标情况表(2003-2008) 
项目/年份 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
达标银行数 8 30 53 100 161 204 
达标资产占比 0.6 47.5 75.1 77.4 79.0 99.9 
数据来源：中国银行业监管管理委员会年报(2008) 
表 1.3 三大国有商业银行资本充足率情况表（2003-2008） 
 
① 中国银行业监督管理委员会 2008 年报。 
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银行/年份 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
中国银行 NA 10.04 10.42 13.59 13.34 13.43 
中国建设银行 9.58 10.01 13.6 12.11 12.58 12.16 














    早在上世纪 90 年代中期，境外战略投资者即已参股中资银行，1996 年，亚
洲开发银行参股中国光大银行，开启了外资参股中国国有商业银行的先例。2005
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